A lawyer can believe that a particular course is best for a client and still have no authority to take it against that client's express instructions. Law Society of Alberta v Schulz, 2026 ABLS 22, concerns an Edmonton personal injury lawyer who arranged a further judicial dispute resolution meeting despite repeated directions from his client not to do so. When their disagreement escalated, the lawyer attempted to withdraw and left the client to attend alone while he was still formally counsel of record. The Law Society of Alberta had already found misconduct on both counts in Law Society of Alberta v Schulz, 2026 ABLS 5. This later decision, dated October 8, 2026, addresses sanction and costs.
The client, identified in the public reasons as MWR, had suffered a brain injury in a 2014 motor vehicle collision and retained Schulz's firm in 2019. An initial judicial dispute resolution conference in October 2020 ended without settlement. MWR wanted more evidence gathered and disputed whether his case was ready for another conference. Although he made those instructions clear over a lengthy period, Schulz's office secured a February 2, 2023 date without first obtaining his agreement. The client learned about the booking weeks later and continued to object. As the deadline for filing the conference brief approached, Schulz sent letters saying he would withdraw. He didn't complete the formal withdrawal process before the conference and didn't attend. The client appeared without a lawyer or a brief. The conference was adjourned, and the underlying personal injury claim eventually settled.
The discipline hearing had found that the booking wasn't a clerical mistake or an ambiguous communication. The committee considered it a deliberate choice to proceed as Schulz thought appropriate despite clear instructions. It also found that a lawyer who wished to stop acting had to comply with the withdrawal requirements under the Alberta Rules of Court and his professional obligations. Sending letters wasn't enough to end his responsibility as counsel of record. The sanction committee emphasized the foreseeable risk of leaving an injured and vulnerable client unsupported at a scheduled court appearance. The eventual adjournment reduced the consequences, but didn't excuse the misconduct.
The Law Society sought a 1 month suspension and its full costs. Schulz argued that a reprimand would be sufficient and that earlier discipline should not be treated as proof he was a repeat offender. The committee accepted an important part of the chronology. His other disciplinary matters concerned misconduct that occurred before the sanctions in those proceedings, and the ordinary principle of increasing punishment after an earlier sanction couldn't simply be applied as though he had disregarded a previous penalty. That didn't make the earlier record irrelevant. It remained part of the wider circumstances, especially where the professional failures were similar and earlier citations had already given some warning. The committee treated the prior decisions as context rather than an automatic reason to suspend him.
The committee was careful about what could fairly count against Schulz. He had defended the allegations rather than admitted misconduct, but he was entitled to do that. It refused to equate the absence of an admission or expressed remorse with a lack of insight, noting his cooperation during the proceedings and the absence of evidence of bad faith or personal gain. It also rejected a suggestion that he had intended to exploit his client's vulnerability. At the same time, it found he had not adequately adjusted communication to account for the client's brain injury and repeated preference for written correspondence. The committee accepted that his conduct caused additional stress and anxiety. It expressly declined to find that an unsatisfactory settlement resulted from the misconduct because the necessary objective evidence wasn't before it.
A reprimand alone was insufficient, but the proposed suspension went further than the committee considered necessary. It imposed a reprimand and a $10,000 fine under section 72 of Alberta's Legal Profession Act. In fixing that amount, it considered the seriousness of both failures, Schulz's considerable experience, the available sanction comparisons and the limits of progressive discipline in this chronology. The committee also ordered $25,000 in costs, payable with the fine by April 30, 2027. Applying the Alberta Court of Appeal's guidance in Charkhandeh v College of Dental Surgeons of Alberta, it rejected full indemnity as a starting presumption, removed court reporter costs associated with the hearing infrastructure, and reduced the remaining amount to reflect Schulz's partial success in resisting suspension and his cooperation.
The decision speaks to an ordinary but easily overlooked limit on professional judgment. A lawyer advises on legal options and their consequences, but the client retains authority to give lawful instructions about how the case is to be conducted. When a disagreement makes continued representation untenable, the answer is a properly managed withdrawal that protects the client and respects the court process. The ruling also shows why professional discipline needs an accurate chronology. Earlier misconduct, earlier citations and earlier sanctions aren't interchangeable, and defending a complaint can't be treated as an additional offence. This was a professional regulatory sanction decision, not an award of damages to the client or a judicial determination that the eventual personal injury settlement was inadequate.
Source
Complete public Law Society of Alberta sanction reasons, October 8, 2026. Hearing Committee file HE20240233, 19 pages, paragraphs 1 to 95 and Appendix A. The separate earlier misconduct determination is identified in these reasons as 2026 ABLS 5. Only the regulator's public redacted version was used, and the client remains identified as MWR.